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US Foreign Policy with Russia EssayIf the United States indispensable to get rid of Russia form inside out then it could have come up with a more strategic policy than the so called strategic relationship/partnership From s incessantlyal(prenominal) aggressive opposed policies to miss leaded advice and undemocratic pressure pending, the US government has brought in some fraction of the so called cold war. Restraint remains heavy to the United States policy with Russia.For instance on the orthogonal policy with Russia, soporraint Lite is comprised of three major efforts to cut off Russia from Europe, from it attached countries and most fundamental from the international community at large (MacLean, G. A. 2006). The geopolitical pluralism policy which came in with the Clintons administration was meant to pay back Russias key neighbors i. e. Kazakhstan and Ukraine has lead to the loosening of the confederation of the post-Soviet assigns.So as to deepen the split which separ ates Russia from the rest of Europe and to enhance the creation of a new steel curtain down in the middle of Eurasia, the US is pushing ahead wildly the expansion of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) by not consulting Russia in several foreign policies e. g. the bombing of Iraq and the similar policy on Yugoslavia. Washington has tried to maneuver capital of the Russian Federation to a diplomatic back vomit up through which it can only have a small diverge globally.Part of the so called soft containment policy of United States is meant to get rid of Russias last state of superpower status and its thermonuclear weapon store without giving enough funding for mothballing the munition and as well as without matching the US stock supplies. By implementing the missile shield defence system, the US has jeopardize several arm treaties through opposing major sales of the Russians armament technology, by inclination that the sale of these arms may lead to professional personli feration of arms while the US itself continues selling these arms consequently applying double standards.Through a largest incr heartsease in the military budget since the ending of the cold war, the Clintons government started 1999 with a clear indication that Russians dec run will have real lowly cause to the pentagon. date implementing Russians initial market reforms, Yeltsin foresaw that hot clock were coming, that was back in 1992. These good times that Yeltsin foresaw retreated more and more into the distance (mostly after the catastrophe of the August 1998 when the fragments went to free drop which led to Moscow defaulting on its capital debts (MacLean, G.A. 2006). Today, Russias GDP is half what it used to be a decade ago. The economy is suffocating with $150 billion in overseas debt. Employees atomic number 18 paid in-kind if they are paid at all, The degree of Poverty is rampant, Life expectancy is worsening, the population is diminishing, and Russia is sinking to a threesome world class (Hearst, D. 2008). Economic swap in Russia has not only been unsuccessful, it has been extremely undemocratic.By collaborating well-nigh entirely with Boris Yeltsin and his hand-picked strategists and circumventing Russias generally elected administration, the Duma the Clinton government placed expediency, transparency, over accountability and the checks and balances of a palpable democratic system. International community invested billions of dollars into Russia, funds that didnt filter down but was instead sidetracked into the pockets of a few selected people. Under its cold war restraint policy, the United States relied on hostile rhetoric and military power to confront the influential Soviet Union.By dissimilarity, todays restraint Lite takes proceeds of Russias military and economic weakness, at first glimpse, has depended more on carrots than sticks. In actuality, however, the United States has wielded these carrots to a great extent like cudgels. Washingtons investments and aid expert advice, and high-profile seminars are designed to reducing the diplomatic and military reach of its former superpower opponent and to re start out the Russian wealth in the neoliberal image in spite of of the social costs. prod by these carrots, Russia is stirring towards a rails that has led to fiscal chaos and escalating hatred.The Clinton government was acutely aware of the danger of a Russian implosion. still the government came up with policies that are relentlessly leading to the realization of its own most horrible fears. The root of U. S. Policies In the 20th century, U. S. policy with Russia fluctuated between hostile confrontation and concise attempts at detente. During these particular eras, Reagan and Truman were move on containing Russia and, if possible, undulating its influence in the third world countries and Eastern Europe.President Nixon, without compromising his anticommunism, was able to ease the tension West and East in the 1970s with a combination of arms control procedures and humble openings in the East for Western trade. During the cold war period, confrontation and engagement frequently pass offed one other with little inhalation room, as in Kennedys near-apocalyptic face-off with Khrushchev over Cuba in 1962 which was followed by the dialogue of the first main arms control accord with the Soviet Union in 1963. Whether in altercation or detente mode, whichever, successive U. S.government sought (often unsuccessfully) to limit Soviet power in the world and crude(a) the impact of socialism/communism. Starting in 1985, when the Russia started a complex dance of reforms and decline, the Bush and Reagan governments did a little to encourage the former and much to make haste the latter. Washington gradually came around to supporting perestroika and glasnost rhetorically. save during this time, the U. S. largely suspended economic support for perestroika while at the same time continuing to p ut forward high levels of build up forces spending and provoking rhetoric.From the year 1989-1991(the Soviets terminal stage) Washington switched to kick downstairs control mode in order to pressure the Soviet Union to support German, protect the impudently independent states of Eastern Europe, unification, and prevent a clash from flaring up due to the secession of the Baltic States ( MacLean, G. A. 2006). In the year 1992, after the official crumple of the Soviet Union, the new Russian President Boris Yeltsin brought in a honeymoon time with the United States. Yeltsin and those in support of Western foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, went on to follow the U.S. economic reform, lead on arms control and universal politics. The other presidents of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) such(prenominal)(prenominal) as Georgias Eduard Shevardnadze, Ukraines Leonid Kravchuk, and Kazakhstans Nursultan Nazarbaevalso followed suit, each contending for the favors and affections of t he United States. In return, the U. S. promised to supporter Russia and the other CIS states integrate into the international economy and later, through the connectt venture for Peace, into European security status. The honeymoon period did not take long.Russia never acknowledged the Marshall Plan it had anticipated for. Nor did the U. S. administration make room at the worlds platform for the new Russian body. This resulted to the pro-Western division in the Russian foreign policy founding, lost influence and Russian national attention became the new organizing principle for the Yeltsin team. The crushing 1994 invasion of Chechnya, the refusal to sanction the latest strategic arms reduction agreement, and the enriching of relations with, Iran, Iraq and Serbia signified a change in Russian policy.For its part, the US government maintained support for Yeltsin personally, but slowly withdrew from close reversible associations. Washington strengthened dealings with the other CIS na tions to balance Russian power in the region and to height its bets. As Sergei Rogov, who was the head of Moscows, Canada and U. S Institute, remarked that the U. S. administrations rhetoric toward Russia has changed from intentional partnership to hardheaded partnership to rational partnership to just plain pragmatism aimed at minimizing the impact of Russias economic and military fallout on the world at large.The relationship is gone, and the change in rhetoric is reflected very concretely in a range of issues from security aspects to economics and to politics. There was a time when Russia was the fuss of U. S. foreign policy intelligence agencies and analysts. Since the 1950s, the Soviet Union underwrote ant colonial revolts all over the third world and provided essential aid to countries such as Cuba, Angola, Syria and India. Today, Russias magnitude has dwindled significantly. It no longer plays a role in the third world countries. It has little influence in Eastern Europe.C loser to home, it has unbroken certain ambitions such as maintaining the integrity of its own region and to keep its influence in its neighboring countries such as, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Georgia. Russias ambitions outstrip its ability, as seen in the losses in Chechnya and peacekeeping downfall in the neighboring countries. Sources have reveled that the Russian armed forces is in dire state the number of its soldiers has reduced by a quarter in 1998, its weapons systems are in a worsening condition, and few finances open to acquire new weapons.Research reveal that it was estimated that by the year 2005 only 5-7% of equipments used by Russians armed forces will be new and the US State Departments admit that the Russian military combat promptness is in bad shape. The drive of the army is even worse now than at the era of the Chechen campaign. As for Russias capability to project force past its borders, little Estonia in recent times declared that its Russian neighbor was no longer a military risk Even its nuclear weapon store, the single card that maintain Russia in the game, is weakening rapidly. The U. S.mainly through NATO expansion is devising gains of this weakness. NATO was intended to deter the expansion of Soviet into Europe. The Soviet Union is no longer there, and Russia badly wants to join Europe and not invade it. Up till now even without an enemy in prospect, NATO is purport right up to Russias door. In April 1999, Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary joined NATO and became NATOs first new members ever since Spain in 1982. There are fifteen countries which now belong to the Partnership for Peace program, which is a halfway entry house for NATO aspirants who need help in modernizing their armed forces.Almost every country in the former Soviet Union bloc supports the expansion of NATO, partially because of NATOs own hard line public relations campaign and partially as an initial step toward joining the EU (European Union). passim the ups and downs of Russian U. S. associations in the 1990s, Russia has measured NATO expansion as a purposeful provocation, particularly when extension has potentially included the Baltic States and the Ukraine. The responses that the U. S. gave Russia were of two initiatives. First, it extended relationship to Russia in the PFP program.Then, promising a unique relationship, NATO conclude an agreement with Moscow in May 1997 that recognized various mechanisms of talks. The agreement doesnt bring out all party the right to sanction the actions of the other. But via the Permanent Joint Council, the two sides at least tinct often. Another task to the future and current reductions in strategic arms is the US governments desire to modify or even scuttle the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) accord in order to give way to a new national missile security system.The US administration favors adjustment, but opponents such as influential US Senators have called for scrapping the accord. The Pentag on apparently offered Moscow a worrying quid pro quo on the ABM treaty if the Russians look the other way as the U. S. develops a missile defense shield system, then Washington will permit Russia to deploy new deliberate missiles with three warheads. While at peace with each other, the two countries are ironically moving away from the control of arms and toward arms expansion. In the meantime, the lions share of the U.S. support to Russia is aimed towards the control and dismantling of its arms, much of it via the conjunct Threat Reduction program. This means that a cash-strapped Russia must pay for its own humbling, and the disarmament process is unfortunately slowed (Hearst, D. 2008).ReferencesGorodetsky, G. (2003). Russia Between East and West. Moscow Routledge. Hearst, D. (2008). US foreign policy on Russia has vacillated wildly, from indulgence to overt aggression. go out Obama get Russia right? Gurdian , 26-33. International, C. E. (2000).U. S. -Russian Relations at the Tur n of the Century. Moscow Carnegie Endowment. MacLean, G. A. (2006). Clintons Foreign Policy in Russia. Florida Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. Marsden, L. (2005). Lessons from Russia. international mile Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. Russia and U. S. Foreign Policy, Available from http//tcarter. blogspot. com/2004/12/russia-and-us-foreign-policy. html (Retrieved 26th November 26, 2008) US Foreign Policy with Russia, Available from http//www. fpif. org/ document/russia/index. html (Retrieved 26th November 26, 2008)